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NOTES
OUTTAKES, HIDDEN CAMERAS, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
On November 5, 1992, the ABC investigative journalism show
PrimeTime Live broadcast a segment about Food Lion, then the
fastest-growing supermarket chain in the nation.' PrimeTime
Live, relying on undercover film footage, reported that Food Lion
employees regularly used unsanitary food handling practices.2
Food Lion's stock fell sharply the next day,3 and its net profits
dropped from $178 million in 1992 to $3.8 million in 1993.'
The television segment broadcast approximately five minutes
out of fifty-five hours of footage5 from a camera smuggled into
the store by an ABC producer working undercover as a meat
wrapper.' Even before the show aired, Food Lion executives
filed suit in federal court in an attempt to block the telecast.7
They charged that the ABC producer had obtained her job under
false pretenses, and that ABC's First Amendment rights "do not
allow it to use illegal means to invade the privacy and property
rights of businesses and people."' After the district court judge
1. See Frank Swoboda, Food Lion Faces Huge U.S. Complaint, WASH. POST, Nov.
7, 1992, at Al.
2. For instance, the show reported that Food Lion employees "routinely cover[ed]
rancid meat with barbecue sauce, repackage[d] it and put it up for sale ... ; use[d]
nail polish remover to change the 'sell by' dates on packaged foods; and even
wash[ed] hams that [had] begun to spoil in a weak solution of bleach to clean them
up and take away the smell." Id.
3. See Food Lion Stock Falls After Report, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1992, at 37.
4. See Marc Gunther, Food Lion, ABC in Tape Tug of War: Grocer Claims Foot-
age Was Shot Illegally, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1995, at D1.
5. See id.
6. See Swoboda, supra note 1, at Al.
7. See id.
8. Id.
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denied the initial request to block the broadcast,' Food Lion
sued again, this time alleging common law fraud, trespass, and
civil conspiracy, and seeking $30 million in damages.'0
On June 30, 1995, ABC filed a motion asking for a protective
order to prevent Food Lion from using the fifty-five hours of vid-
eotape footage outside of the case.1 The magistrate judge re-
fused to grant the network's protective order, stating that ABC
had not made "a clear showing of confidentiality, privilege, or
copyright infringement." 2
Finally, in August 1995, Food Lion attorneys screened the
outtakes" for the -first time, after which Food Lion claimed that
the footage did not support the broadcast segment. 4 ABC's law-
yers insisted that the program was fair. 5 Furthermore, they ar-
gued that ABC News should be able to keep the footage confi-
dential because it was similar to notes taken by print reporters,
and therefore protected by the First Amendment. 6 Neverthe-
less, the jurors were allowed to view some of the outtakes. 7
9. See id.
10. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 812
(M.D.N.C. 1995); Food Lion Sues ABC for Tapes, $100 Million, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 14, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2678169.
11. See Food Lion Seeks Right to ABC Tapes, PR NEWSWIRE, July 13, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, US File. Food Lion wanted the footage for use in
related lawsuits and to defend its reputation. See Gunther, supra note 4, at D1.
12. Food Lion Seeks Right to ABC Tapes, supra note 11. Food Lion also filed an-
other suit, seeking $100 million in damages, alleging copyright infringement after
learning that in 1993 ABC had filed to copyright the videotapes. See Food Lion
Sues, Seeks Undercover TV Tapes, ATL. J. & CONST., July 14, 1995, at 113, available
in 1995 WL 6535927.
13. Outtakes are unbroadcast videotaped material.
14. See Gunther, supra note 4, at D1.
15. See id.
16. "'These videotapes are copyrighted, protected by the reporter's privilege and
treated as confidential by ABC." Id.
17. See Dorothy Rabinowitz, ABC's Food Lion Mission, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1997,
at A20. Because Food Lion never sued for libel or legally contested the accuracy of
the broadcast, the jury did not have to determine if the broadcast itself or the
outtakes were truthful. See Howard Kurtz & Sue Anne Pressley, Jury Finds Against
ABC for $5.5 Million, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1997, at Al. In fact, the judge told the
jury to assume that the broadcast was true. See David E. Rovella, After $ 5.5 Mil-
lion Fraud Victory, Supermarket Chain Faces Shareholder Lawsuit, NATL L.J. Feb.
10, 1997, at A7. The jury's final verdict of fraud and trespass was based on the fact
that the two ABC producers had lied to get jobs at Food Lion, and had used hidden
cameras. See Kurtz & Pressley, supra, at Al.
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This Note focuses on investigative journalism and hidden
cameras and examines the implications of constitutional protec-
tion for reporter work product in the forms of both standard and
hidden camera outtakes. This Note posits that the courts are
biased against television reporter work product, and that this
bias arises from a general prejudice against television as a medi-
um. Arguing that such bias is inappropriate, this Note concludes
that interference with the editorial process is a less appropriate
control on media than other currently available controls.
THE REPORTERS PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Underlying Rationales
Although the Constitution does not provide explicitly for a
reporter's privilege, the media have argued successfully that the
First Amendment mandates a privilege protecting confidential
news sources."8 At least two strands of reasoning have devel-
oped in support of such a privilege grounded in the First Amend-
ment. 9 The first falls under the rubric of the "public's right to
know,"" an argument invoked by Justice Brennan in Herbert v.
Lando." A second grounding of the privilege, the "structuralist"
The parties differed as to the role that they thought the outtakes played in the
verdict. ABC spokeswoman Eileen Murphy stated that the verdict was unrelated to
the extra footage, but Food Lion attorney Richard Wyatt, Jr. said that the outtakes
were "very influential'" in the jury's decision. See Howard Kurtz, Jury Finds ABC
Committed Fraud in Food Lion Investigative Story, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1996, at
A7 (quoting Wyatt). Of course, if the verdict truly rested only upon the fraudulent
job applications and the hidden cameras, then the content of the outtakes need nev-
er have been revealed.
18. See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1450, 1602 (1985) [hereinafter Developments].
19. See James J. Mangan, Note, Contempt for the Fourth Estate: No Reporter's
Privilege Before a Congressional Investigation, 83 GEO. L.J. 129, 147-48 (1994).
20. Id. at 148.
21. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). Justice Brennan stated that:
In recognition of the social values served by the First Amendment, our
decisions have referred to "the right of the public to receive suitable ac-
cess to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences,"
and to "the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in
virtue of the constitutional guaranties."
Id. at 188 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969)); See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
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view, was most notably advanced by Justice Stewart in a speech
given at Yale Law School." Justice Stewart's structuralist view
of the privilege has, perhaps, a firmer constitutional foundation,
while Justice Brennan's argument for the public's right to know
relies more on overarching public policy rationales. Although
both arguments appear in the case law discussing the reporter's
privilege, Justice Brennan's view has greater appeal, and often
has been invoked in subsequent First Amendment decisions.'
Branzburg v. Hayes-The Seminal Case
Branzburg v. Hayes' involved four consolidated cases in
which reporters claimed a First Amendment privilege to with-
hold testimony before a grand jury.' Noting that "news gather-
ing is not without its First Amendment protections,"" the ma-
22. Justice Stewart argued that:
[T]he Free Press guarantee is, in essence, a structural provision of the
Constitution. Most of the other provisions in the Bill of Rights protect
specific liberties or specific rights of individuals ... . In contrast, the
Free Press Clause extends protection to an institution. The publishing
business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given
explicit constitutional protection.
It is tempting to suggest that freedom of the press means only that
newspaper publishers are guaranteed freedom of expression. They are
guaranteed that freedom, to be sure, but so are we all, because of the
Free Speech Clause. If the Free Press guarantee meant no more than
freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy.
Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975).
23. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980)
(noting that "[iun a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment
right to 'receive information and ideas'") (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 762 (1972)); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980)
(noting that "compelled production of a reporter's resource materials . . . may sub-
stantially undercut the public policy favoring the free flow of information to the pub-
lic that is the foundation for the privilege").
24. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
25. See Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), reu'd sub nom.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky.
1971), affd sub nom. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665; Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345
(Ky. 1970), affd sub nom. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297
(Mass. 1971), affd sub nom. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665. The respondent in the prima-
ry case, the Honorable John P. Hayes, was the successor of Judge Pound. See
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668 n.3.
26. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
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jority nevertheless refused to recognize a "constitutional
newsman's privilege"27 and held that "requiring newsmen to
appear and testify before state or federal grand juries [does not]
abridge[ I the freedom of speech and press." ' In hindsight, the
majority opinion has not directed definitively the future of the
reporter's privilege; rather, Justice Powell's concurrence29 and
Justice Stewart's dissent"0 have proven more influential.
In his brief concurrence, Justice Powell emphasized that the
Court's holding addressed a narrow question3 ' and suggested
that "[the asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its
facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the
press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony
with respect to criminal conduct."
3 2
In his dissent, Justice Stewart proposed that the government
should be required to fulfill a three-part test in order to over-
come a reporter's privilege.33 The test would require the govern-
ment to:
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the
newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific
probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the informa-
tion sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less de-
structive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a
compelling and overriding interest in the information.'
Justice Stewart further noted that Justice Powell's "enigmatic
concurring opinion gives some hope of a more flexible view in
the future."35
27. Id. at 703-04.
28. Id. at 667. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, wrote the opinion of the Court. See id& at 665.
29. See id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
30. See id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
31. See id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell further noted that "the
court-when called upon to protect a newsman from improper or prejudicial
questioning-would be free to balance the competing interests on their merits in the
particular case." Id at 710 n.* (Powell, J., concurring).
33. See id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
34. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
35. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Commentators disagree over which opinion has most influ-
enced the reporter's privilege.36 Both Justice Powell's and Jus-
tice Stewart's arguments are persuasive, and the United States
Courts of Appeals have varied in which argument they have cho-
sen to follow. 7
Taking Branzburg to the Limit
After the Supreme Court established the framework, the low-
er courts began tinkering with the concept of a reporter's privi-
lege, taking it far beyond the majority's holding in Branzburg.8
Combining a rationale culled from Federal Rule of Evidence 501
with the language of Branzburg, courts expanded the protection
available to journalists.39 Two cases, one from the Second Cir-
36. See Paul Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of the Common Law,
Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 AIZ. L. REV. 815, 838
(1984) ("The now widely accepted view of Branzburg, therefore, is that it was limited
by the specific facts ... and that the case-by-case [balancing] analysis must be
used .... While this view is not universally held, it is certainly the clear majority
position, especially in federal courts.") (footnotes omitted); see also Developments,
supra note 18, at 1603-04 ("The equivocal nature of the Branzburg decision has en-
abled lower federal courts to create a media source privilege based on the [Flirst
[A]mendment.... The result has been the adoption of Justice Powell's ap-
proach . . . .") (footnotes omitted). But see Carl C. Monk, Evidentiary Privilege for
Journalists' Sources: Theory and Statutory Protection, 51 MO. L. REV. 1 (1986). Monk
noted that:
a majority, consisting of the four dissenters and Powell, explicitly recog-
nized a constitutional right to protect sources. The post-Branzburg history
of reporter's privilege in the courts demonstrates that, in states without a
shield statute, a qualified privilege much like that suggested in Justice
Stewart's dissent has become the prevailing doctrine in both the lower
federal and the state courts.
Id. at 24-25 (footnotes omitted).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying
a three-pronged test requiring that the information sought be "highly material and
relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim, and not obtainable
from other available sources"); Bruno & Stillnan, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633
F.2d 583, 595-96 (1st Cir. 1980) (balancing potential harm to the free flow of infor-
mation against the asserted need for the requested information).
38. See Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment,
44 STAN. L. REv. 927, 929 (1992) ("Extrapolating from the majority's language in
Branzburg that 'news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,' as
well as from Justice Powell's pivotal concurring opinion, many lower courts have rec-
ognized a qualified privilege that protects against the disclosure of confidential
sources, confidential information, and unpublished materials.") (footnotes omitted).
39. See generally FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that privilege shall be governed by
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and the other from the Third Circuit, evinced strong support for
a privilege and employed representative reasoning. 0 The Third
Circuit emphasized balancing the relevant interests,41 while the
common law except where state law applies). One commentator argued:
Soon after Branzburg, great attention was given to Rule 501 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence ... The language of the Rule is intentionally
vague. The key phrase is that judges in determining privilege should look
to the "light of reason and experience." In spite of the apparently con-
trary view of Justice White and three other Justices, many federal judges
seized upon this language to declare that, in the media representative
context, "the courts should continue to develop the federal common law of
privilege on a case-by-case basis."
Marcus, supra note 36, at 840 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lewis v. United States,
517 F.2d 236, 238 n.4 (9th Cir. 1975)).
40. See United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980).
41. See Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 148. Cuthbertson, decided one year after Herbert
v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), involved the federal prosecution of the principals of a
restaurant chain on charges of conspiracy and fraud. See Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at
142. Nine months prior to the grand jury indictment, the chain had been the subject
of a segment broadcast on 60 Minutes. See id. One month before trial, the defen-
dants served CBS with a subpoena duces tecum asking for the notes, outtakes, and
any other videotapes or documents used in preparation for the program. See id. CBS
moved to quash the subpoena, asserting a qualified First Amendment privilege. See
id. CBS also raised an objection under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c). See
id. at 144. For a discussion of the Cuthbertson test see infra notes 76-77 and accom-
panying text.
In Cuthbertson, the Third Circuit cited its earlier holding that journalists have
a federal common law qualified privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to re-
fuse to divulge confidential sources in civil cases. See id. at 146 (citing Riley v. City
of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979)). The court noted that "CBS's interest in
protecting confidential sources, preventing intrusion into the editorial process, and
avoiding the possibility of self-censorship created by compelled disclosure of sources
and unpublished notes does not change because a case is civil or criminal." Id. at
147.
Recognizing the "strong public policy supporting the unfettered communication to
the public of information and opinion," id. at 146, and finding support in Branzburg,
the court extended its earlier holding, giving journalists a qualified privilege not to
disclose unpublished information in their possession in criminal cases. See id. at
146-47. The court then echoed the language of Justice Powell in Branzburg, stating
that the court must "balance the. . . need for the material against the interests
underlying the privilege." Id. at 148.
The Third Circuit has since adopted a three-pronged test. See, e.g., Doe v.
Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 853 F. Supp. 150, 151 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("First, the movant
must demonstrate that he has made an effort to obtain the information from other
sources. Second, he must demonstrate that the only access to the information sought
is through the journalist and her sources. Finally, the movant must persuade the
court that the information sought is crucial to the claim.").
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Second Circuit employed a more explicit three-pronged test.42
The lower courts have taken advantage of possible avenues
that the Supreme Court has prescribed (or, at any rate, not pro-
scribed), for formulating some sort of reporter's privilege. Nine
circuit courts have recognized a qualified privilege expressly,43
two have not addressed the issue,44 and only one has decided
that no such privilege exists.45
THE PRIVILEGE APPLIED: HOW Do OUTTAKES FARE?
Standard of Review
Branzburg was the Supreme Court's last ruling on the
reporter's privilege, 46 and the lower courts have cobbled togeth-
er their own body of privilege law.47 The tests, however, are
fairly similar from circuit to circuit. Generally speaking,
reporter's work product issues undergo a two-tiered review.
42. In Burke, the defendants' convictions arose in connection with the Boston Col-
lege "point-shaving scandal" that occurred during the 1978-1979 basketball season.
See Burke, 700 F.2d at 73. Prior to the appeal, Sports Illustrated published an arti-
cle purporting to be a firsthand account of the point-shaving scheme, see id. at 73
n.1, by a witness who testified in the trial under a grant of immunity. See id. at
83. The defendants served a subpoena seeking production of all the documents and
tapes relating to the Sports Illustrated article. See id. at 76.
The court recognized the need to balance First Amendment interests against
evidentiary needs, but in its analysis relied primarily on a three-pronged test drawn
directly from Justice Stewart's proposal in Branzburg. See id. at 77-78 (citing
Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 139 and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)); see also
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (applying the three-pronged
test). The court held that "disclosure may be ordered only upon a clear and specific
showing that the information is: highly material and relevant, necessary or critical
to the maintenance of the claim, and not obtainable from other available sources."
Burke, 700 F.2d at 76-77 (citations omitted).
43. See, e.g., Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 416 (9th Cir. 1995); LaRouche v. Na-
tional Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986); Burke, 700 F.2d at 77; Zerilli
v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe News-
paper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595-96 (1st Cir. 1980); Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 147; Miller
v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980); Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464
F.2d 986, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1972).
44. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.
45. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1987).
46. See MARc A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
MASS MEDIA LAW 523 (5th ed. 1995).
47. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
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The first step usually involves a threshold determination of
whether work product should receive in camera review.4" This
evidentiary determination follows the procedure outlined in
United States v. Nixon.49 If the reporter's materials at issue ful-
fill these first-tier threshold guidelines, then the court may move
to the second tier of constitutional review, employing either the
three-pronged test or applying balancing analysis used by the
specific circuit court in order to determine whether the privilege
exists.50
The Standard Applied
As stated by one noted media scholar, "[t]he law governing
reporters' work product is 'not very developed'."51 Very few deci-
sions deal with outtakes specifically, and the existing recent de-
cisions are scattered throughout the federal courts.52 Taken as
48. Courts are not required by the Federal Rules of Evidence to conduct an in
camera review. Many judges, however, appear to feel that an in camera review is
the best way to balance the values of the First Amendment against the need for
discovery. See, eg., Burke, 700 F.2d at 78 n.9 (noting that courts are encouraged to
inspect sensitive documents, including media work product, to determine if they con-
tain probative evidence); United States v. Gambino, 741 F. Supp. 412, 414 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (noting that "in camera inspections provide a useful intermediate step between
full disclosure and total nondisclosure").
49. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). In Nixon, the Presidents counsel moved to quash the
Special Prosecutor's subpoena for the Watergate tapes on two grounds: first, that the
subpoena failed to meet the requirements of Rule 17(c) of the Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure; and second, that the tapes were subject to executive privilege. See i& at
686. The Court applied a four-pronged test based on Rule 17(c), see id. at 699-700,
considered the weight of the privilege, and determined that the tapes should be pro-
duced. See id. at 713-14.
The Rule 17(c) test requires that the moving party show:
(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are
not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due
diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without
such production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to
obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4)
that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a gen-
eral "fishing expedition."
Id. at 699-700.
50. See supra notes 41-42.
51. Gunther, supra note 4, at D1 (quoting Professor Rodney Smolla, College of
William & Mary School of Law).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980) (recog-
nizing a qualified reporter's privilege for outtakes); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C.,
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whole, however, the cases suggest that outtakes are more likely
to be discoverable than other forms of journalistic work product
for two reasons: the inherent nature of the medium, and a sub-
tle judicial bias that favors "traditional" written work product.53
Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C.' provides a lens through
which to examine these arguments. In Kohn, the plaintiff
brought action under the Americans with Disabilities Act
against the law firm of Kohn, Nast & Graf.55 Doe had worked
at the firm as an associate, and alleged that the partners had
fired him when they discovered that he was HIV-positive.5"
After the plaintiff filed the lawsuit, ABC, CBS, and NBC each
interviewed him.57 Both ABC and NBC broadcast a portion of
the interviews.58
The portions of the interviews that were actually broadcast
were produced in discovery.59 The defendants, however, also
subpoenaed the networks for the unbroadcast outtakes." ABC,
CBS, and NBC objected to production, asserting a reporter's
privilege arising under "federal common law and the First
Amendment to the Constitution."8" In analyzing the networks'
assertion, the district court performed a two-tiered review.62
In camera Review
The district court first noted that an in camera review of the
tapes "would be helpful, if not essential, to its analysis,"' and
853 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (Kohn 1); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 853 F.
Supp. 150 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (Kohn II); United States v. Bingham, 765 F. Supp. 954
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (compelling a television station to deliver video outtakes to defense
counsel); infra note 92.
53. See infra notes 104-30 and accompanying text.
54. Kohn I, 853 F. Supp. 147; Kohn II, 853 F. Supp. 150.
55. See Kohn I, 853 F. Supp. at 147.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 148.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
63. Kohn I, 843 F. Supp. at 149. Courts invoke in camera review as a layer of
protection for the media. See, e.g., United States v. Lalouche Campaign, 841 F.2d
1176, 1178 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that "to minimize intrusion, [the court] required
1826
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used United States v. Cuthbertson' as its template.65 In
Cuthbertson, CBS argued that "even in camera review inhibits
the journalist's exercise of rights protected by the first
amendment."66 In analyzing CBS's argument, the Third Circuit
gave a mixed message as to how effectively the media can pro-
tect itself against in camera review in cases involving outtakes.
The court concluded that in camera review is justified if the
defendant satisfies the Nixon test" and also establishes "that
the information sought is not available from another source." 61
In its analysis, the court noted that the second and third ele-
ments of the Nixon test did not apply to cases in which the in-
formation was produced only to the court.69 The resulting anal-
ysis therefore consisted of three prongs: good faith (an element
of the Nixon test), unavailability, and relevancy (also a Nixon
test element).70
The troubling aspect of this framework is the way in which
the court characterized the materials at issue-verbatim state-
ments of witnesses taken by CBS: "[b]y their very nature, these
statements are not obtainable from any other source. They are
unique bits of evidence that are frozen at a particular place and
time."7' The verbatim statements at issue included outtakes of
interviews as well as written transcripts.72 Under the court's
rationale, outtakes are always "not obtainable from any other
source."73 Video "freezes" testimony, more so than any other
medium.
Carried to its logical conclusion, the Third Circuit's analysis in
Cuthbertson suggests that outtakes almost always will be admis-
sible for in camera review. If outtakes by definition are "not
that the materials be submitted under seal subject to in camera review and possible
release to defendants later on").
64. 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980).
65. See Kohn 1, 683 F. Supp. at 149.
66. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 148 (emphasis added).
67. See supra note 49.
68. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 148.
69. See id. at 145; supra note 49.
70. See Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 145.
71. Id. at 148.
72. See id. at 142.
73. Id. at 148.
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sible for in camera review. If outtakes by definition are "not
obtainable," then the party seeking them need only show eviden-
tiary relevance and good faith.74 This standard is significantly
less stringent than that required for production to parties, which
requires that the evidence be highly relevant and critical to the
claim.75
The result in Kohn I illustrates this conclusion. In that case,
the court asked whether the outtakes sought consisted of rele-
vant evidentiary matter and whether they were available else-
where.76 The court easily found evidentiary relevance in the
tapes because John Doe's "credibility [would] play an important
role at trial."77
In addressing whether the videotapes were unavailable else-
where, the court followed exactly the thread of reasoning in
Cuthbertson: "In short, verbatim statements are unique. The
only source of this information is from the videotapes them-
selves. Plaintiff cannot possibly be expected to remember or
recite, at a later time, exactly what he said in prolonged inter-
views such as those involved here."78 Not surprisingly, the court
ordered production of the outtakes for in camera review.79
Production to the Parties
In Kohn IlY° the district court, in deciding whether to compel
production to the parties, employed a three-pronged standard."'
74. The court did not decide whether defendants needed to make any additional
showing to compel production of the statements at trial. See id. at 149.
75. See supra note 42.
76. See Kohn I, 853 F. Supp. at 149. In applying the Cuthbertson test, the district
court noted that "[alithough this is not a criminal case, given the nature of the
qualified privilege, we see no reason to apply a different standard in a civil action."
Id. at 149 n.6. Facially, the court's statement shows attentiveness to First Amend-
ment concerns. Given the ease with which the in camera review standard is met,
the attentiveness is not substantive.
77. Id. at 150. The court found that the videotapes "could be used for im-
peachment purposes and would be admissible as admissions." Id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 853 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (Kohn II).
81. See id. at 151. The court stated:
First, the movant must demonstrate that he has made an effort to obtain
the information from other sources. Second, he must demonstrate that
1828
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The court previously found that the second prong, unavailability,
already had been met when it made its in camera determina-
tion. 2 The unavailability requirement swallowed the first
prong-a good faith effort to find the information elsewhere. The
court therefore needed only to inquire whether the information
sought was crucial to the claim." The court determined that
the outtakes, in fact, were not crucial, finding that no material
discrepancies existed between the interview statements and the
deposition testimony.'
Where the Law Leaves Us
Thus, at least in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the
tests governing outtake production to judges and parties experi-
enced considerable pruning." For production in camera, a party
the only access to the information sought is through the journalist and
her sources. Finally, the movant must persuade the court that the infor-
mation sought is crucial to the claim.
Id. (quoting United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1980)).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 152. Arguably, situations could exist in which the information would
be available from other sources. For instance, a private (nonmedia) individual could
film a public event. In Russo v. Geagan, 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1403 (D. Mass. 1983),
the plaintiffs alleged that while attending a KKK rally unidentified police officers as-
saulted them without justification. See id. at 1404. The rally was filmed by the news
media and the court ordered production of the outtakes. See id. at 1407. The First
Circuit uses a strict balancing analysis, see id. at 1406, so the Massachusetts court
did not have to discuss explicitly whether the information was available
elsewhere. Absent concrete evidence to the contrary, even under the three-pronged
test, it seems highly unlikely that any court would require the seeking party to
speak with every individual who might have filmed a public event.
84. See Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Gra, P.C., 853 F. Supp. 150, 152 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(Kohn I) ("In order to make this determination, we have read the pleadings and
over 1,600 pages of plaintiffs deposition, reviewed numerous deposition exhibits, and
watched the unabridged ABC, CBS, and NBC interviews.").
85. The Third Circuit's decisions model most of the pro-protection options avail-
able. As one commentator has noted, the "reporter's privilege has been most fully
developed in the Third Circuit [which has also given] a strong reading of the Penn-
sylvania shield law." James C. Goodale et-al., Reporter's Privilege Cases, in 2 COM-
MUNICATIONS LAw 1993 at 787 (Practicing Law Inst. ed., 1993). The Second Circuit
"has provided substantial protection for reporters' First Amendment interests" as
well. Id. at 782.
Although by no means conclusive, one comparison suggests that the Third Cir-
cuit at least sometimes can be more sympathetic to media concerns. In Cuthbertson,
the district court found CBS in civil contempt and fined them one dollar per day.
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simply must show that the outtakes are part of any relevant
evidentiary matter.86 The use of outtakes for impeachment pur-
poses fulfills this standard,87 therefore any videotape of any
witness making a statement almost automatically will be avail-
able for in camera review, regardless of whether the footage
would be admissible on the merits." The Supreme Court is not
likely to find an absolute privilege for any reporter work prod-
uct, Justice Douglas's impassioned dissent in Branzburg not-
withstanding." However much one feels that judicial review of
a reporter's work product intrudes into the editorial process, it is
here to stay.
The test for production to parties consists of a single
prong-whether the outtakes are crucial to the claim.' Because
this question involves more substantive concerns, courts issue
orders for production to parties less often than in the in camera
review context.9 In some instances courts stretch to find inno-
vative solutions in order to avoid requiring production." Even
See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 1980). In contrast, in
United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988), the district
court found NBC in civil contempt for refusing to submit its outtakes and ordered
them to pay a fine of $500 per day. See id. at 1177.
86. The court in Kohn I dispensed with the "good faith" portion of the Rule 17(c)
analysis. See Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 853 F. Supp. 147, 149 n.6 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (Kohn 1) (describing the court's interpretation of Rule 17(c)).
87. See Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 144. The footage at issue in Cuthbertson was ad-
mitted only for impeachment purposes. See id. at 148.
88. For example, in LaRouche, the court affirmed an order for in camera inspec-
tion of interview outtakes with a prospective key witness. See LaRouche, 841 F.2d at
1183; see also United States v. Cutler, 6 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1993) (ordering in
camera review); United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(ordering in camera review); United States v. Bingham, 765 F. Supp. 954, 956 (N.D.
Ill. 1991) (ordering in camera review).
89. "My belief is that all of the 'balancing' was done by those who wrote the Bill
of Rights. By casting the First Amendment in absolute terms, they repudiated the
timid, watered-down, emasculated versions of the First Amendment [presented by the
three-pronged test]." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
90. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 78 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1983) (or-
dering discovery of outtakes for in camera inspection, but then finding the evidence
to be cumulative and refusing production to the parties).
92. For instance, in Bingham, outtakes of an NBC interview with a key govern-
ment witness were requested. See Bingham, 765 F. Supp. at 956. The court conduct-
ed an in camera review and found that inconsistent statements existed. See id. at
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so, outtakes often are found to be relevant, crucial, and produc-
ible, perhaps to a greater extent than are other forms of work
product. Two rationales supporting this argument are discern-
ible throughout the cases.
"Unique bits of evidence"
First, the language in Cuthbertson and Kohn describing the
intrinsic nature of the medium93 does not stand alone-most of
the cases dealing with outtakes include numerous such state-
ments. For instance, in LaRouche the court ordered in camera
production of almost two hours of interview outtakes involving a
key government witness.' The court referred to the statements
in Cuthbertson, noting that "[nlo other source (by definition)
[was] available."95  Additionally, the court found that the
witness's "facial expressions might well be directly relevant to
showing animus against defendants."" Video footage is the only
medium about which this could ever be said, and the fact that
the court took note of it is telling." The same undercurrent ani-
mated United States v. Sanusi," a case involving a Secret Ser-
vice search of a defendant's home.99 A CBS camera crew accom-
panied the agents at the search, filming the entire proce-
view and turned the entire manuscript over to the defendant. See id. at 959. The
court then noted that if the witness were to make a statement at trial inconsistent
with the transcript, it would allow the videotaped portion to be introduced. See id.
"The court believes this procedure minimizes to the extent possible the intrusion on
NBC's newsgathering privilege and acknowledges NBC's proprietary rights in the
[outtakes] while according defense counsel the information they currently need to
cross-examine Harris." I& at 960.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 73 & 78.
94. See United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1183 (1st Cir. 1988).
95. Id. at 1180.
96. Id.
97. The court in Bingham relied on the statements made in Cuthbertson and
LaRouche in deciding that the interview outtakes at issue were relevant and crucial.
See Bingham, 765 F. Supp. 958-59. The court made a transcript of the tapes rather
than ordering that the actual tapes be produced, see id. at 959-an odd solution for
evidence that "by [its] very nature... [is] unique." Id. at 959 (quoting United
States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1980)). The court, however, also
provided that actual footage could be used at trial after the witness testified, if it
were deemed highly relevant. See id. at 959-60.
98. 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
99. See id. at 151.
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panied the agents at the search, filming the entire proce-
dure.' In issuing the discovery order, the court reasoned that
the outtakes "would provide defendant a window through which
he could demonstrate to the jury with extraordinary clarity the
government's zeal to arrest him."'0 ' This language is a more
subtle variation on the ideas formulated in Cuthbertson and
developed in LaRouche °2 State courts, as well, have used sim-
ilar language when addressing discovery of outtakes under their
constitutions or shield statutes.'
The fact that some judges may consider outtakes to be a
unique form of evidence is not the decisive factor in any decision
to order production. The language of Cuthbertson and LaRouche,
and the cases that rely upon them on this point, is not conclu-
sive. It does demonstrate, however, that judges implicitly consid-
er video evidence to be in a category all its own, a view that
makes it more likely that outtakes will receive different treat-
ment. 
0 4
100. See id.
101. Id. at 159-60 (emphasis added). Another federal court, addressing this issue
under state law, questioned whether "an 'ear-witness' account of [plaintiffs] state-
ments would, in any event, properly serve in the stead of a word-for-word sound re-
cording." Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 131 F.R.D. 421, 426 (1990) (citing
Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 148). But see United States v. Lopez, 14 Media. L. Rep.
(BNA) 2203, 2205 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (finding that the presence of the party seeking
production and her counsel at the interview adequately replaced outtakes of the
interview).
102. See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
103. For example, see CBS, Inc. v. Jackson, 578 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1991) in which
the court noted:
In the case under review, the sought-after discovery is the untelevised
CBS videotapes of [defendant's] arrest. From a [Flirst [A]mendment privi-
lege standpoint, we can perceive no significant difference in the examina-
tion of an electronic recording of an event and verbal testimony about
the event .... We see no realistic threat of restraint or impingement on
the news-gathering process ... [even though] the media may be some-
what inconvenienced.
Id. at 700; see also WBAL-TV Div., The Hearst Corp. v. Maryland, 477 A.2d 776,
782 (Md. Ct. App. 1984) (finding production of the outtakes to be necessary because
neither "the reporter [nor] her cameraman . . . is likely to remember the statements
word for word").
104. For instance, in a related area, attorney work product cannot be discovered by
the opposing party unless that party shows the inability "without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3). One court has noted that because "tapes generally capture historical occur-
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Of course, differing treatment based on the intrinsic nature of
the medium is not necessarily offensive. The idea that outtakes
are "unique bits of evidence"" 5 is credible: video often is more
inescapably realistic than print, and perhaps more vivid as
well."0 6 Moreover, video (and audio) recording is more techni-
cally accurate than written notes. Consequently, the courts'
reliance on statements such as those in Cuthbertson0 7 is only
a first (and perhaps reasonable) step toward overt differentiation
between broadcast and print work product.
An Underlying Judicial Bias?
The second thread running through the cases is more subtle.
When the court in Kohn I ordered production of outtakes for in
camera review, it noted that "[wie do not believe that [review of
outtakes] will inhibit the work of a free press, particularly be-
cause neither a confidential source nor a reporter's notes or recol-
lections are involved."' The court granted outtakes second-
class status and explicitly expressed a judicial bias favoring
"traditional" written work product. 9 The court in Kohn I cited
no authority for this statement, nor did it supply its own ratio-
nale. A close examination of other work product decisions, and
other areas of media law, however, suggests that an inherent
bias exists against nonprint media work product, and the
nonprint media.
rences ... and because the tapes are only available from the party who took them,
most courts have held that this prong of Rule 26(b)(3) is automatically satisfied
when a party seeks discovery of surveillance tapes." Fisher v. National R.R. Passen-
ger Corp., 152 F.R.D. 145, 151 n.9 (S.D. Ind. 1993). Of course, the party still must
meet the "substantial need" prong of the Rule. See idk at 151.
105. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 148.
106. For a discussion of biases against broadcast and the popularity of television,
see infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
107. See Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 148; supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
108. Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 853 F. Supp. 147, 150 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (Kohn
1) (emphasis added).
109. See id.
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What Bias, and Why?
Media Work Product Cases Beyond Kohn
In United States v. Sanusi,"° the court considered quashing
a subpoena duces tecum against CBS News.' The court ana-
lyzed the First Amendment newsgathering privilege and noted
that "[t]here is no reason why rules for print reporters should
not apply to other media.""' The court, however, then complet-
ed the sentence, noting that such rules ought to be similarly
applicable "particularly since television techniques allow the
identities of informants to be blocked out electronically."'
This statement is puzzling. The court recognized that the privi-
lege applies to both confidential sources and nonconfidential
materials,"' but then turned the rationale on its head. The en-
tire statement is not internally consistent unless the court
meant that television footage should be more easily discoverable
because of the technological protections of confidentiality that it
provides. Ignoring the fact that nonconfidential materials also
deserve protection, the court argues that television's technology
undermines the policy rationales for protecting it like print work
product."5
Krause v. Graco Children Products, Inc. provides another
example of subtle bias."6 In Krause, the defendant subpoenaed
NBC News for notes and outtakes relating to an interview con-
ducted with plaintiffs and their attorneys on NBC's newsmaga-
zine show Dateline."7 During oral argument, the defendant
agreed to limit the scope of the subpoena to include only the
110. 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
111. See id. at 151. A crew from CBS, including a camera operator and a sound
technician, had accompanied the Secret Service as they executed a search warrant.
See id. CBS filmed for approximately 20 minutes. See id.
112. Id. at 153.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. The Ninth Circuit has argued under a different aegis that work product
gathered by new technology might deserve less protection, noting that "[wle strongly
disagree ... that the hidden mechanical contrivances are 'indispensable tools' of
newsgathering." Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
116. 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA). 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
117. See id. at 1029.
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outtakes."' In refusing to quash the subpoena, the judge noted
that he was "somewhat amazed to find that this matter was
litigated as far as it has been. NBC has no interest in the out-
takes and any statements contained therein were never consid-
ered confidential by those being interviewed.... This type of
useless proceeding merely clogs the dockets of our courts."119
Granted, the court could have had the same attitude toward the
written notes had they been at issue; the fact that the notes
were omitted from consideration, however, along with the
court's cavalier treatment of NBC's First Amendment inter-
ests,12' suggests that the type of work product at stake colored
the court's attitude.
In United States v. Cutler," several print reporters received
subpoenas for their notes as well as for outtakes from CBS and
Fox television.' In the course of pretrial hearings, the televi-
sion stations advised the court that they would not disclose the
outtakes to the parties, but would allow the judge to conduct an
in camera review." The print reporters made no such offer
and stated that they would not produce anything unless ordered
to do so by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.'25 What is in-
teresting is not the final outcome of the motion to quash,2 ' but
the fact that the print reporters did not consider in camera re-
118. See id. Unfortunately, the court did not explain why the defendant agreed to
do so. Perhaps he felt his chances of obtaining the notes were slim, or perhaps they
were not needed for trial. As too much information is generally better than not
enough, the first choice is a logical guess.
119. Id. at 1030.
120. See id. at 1029.
121. See id. at 1030. This disregard for First Amendment interests is striking,
considering the "general rule that the greatest protection is afforded the journalist's
privilege when the press is subpoenaed in a civil litigation to which it is not a par-
ty." Bradosky v. Volkswagon of Am., Inc., No. M8-85 (SWKI, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
571 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1988). See also Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d
Cir. 1972) (holding that nondisclosure of the identity of a journalistic source is per-
missible); United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 600 F. Supp.
667, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussing a reporter's right not to disclose sources).
122. 6 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1993).
123. See id. at 68.
124. See id. at 70.
125. See id.
126. The judge ordered production of portions of the print and video work product
material. See id. at 75.
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view to be an option. In camera review often is touted as an
ideal compromise in cases dealing with outtakes, 12 7 but it is
not used to the same extent in cases involving print work prod-
uct.'28 Of course, the distinctions drawn between the two me-
dia are not dispositive. They do suggest, however, that although
print work product is a heavyweight-treated with an "all or
none" attitude-video work product holds a middleweight status
in at least one concrete area.
Superficially, according outtakes less respect has some intu-
itive appeal. A reporter's notes involve his trained eye and pro-
fessional instincts, not indiscriminately registered information.
Notes are a conduit into a reporter's thoughts and views.
Outtakes, however, are recorded mechanically. They are not
personal; they do not involve independent thought.
Why should this distinction matter? Editorial processes are
editorial processes. As one journalist has noted, "[it's not a
quantum leap from scribbling on a matchbook or writing in a
notebook to the use of a tape recorder. It's all just notes, a col-
lections of words or bleeps or electronic impulses that a reporter
uses to do the job."'29 Presumably, the same argument could be
made for video, and in fact, video has more of the quality of
written notes than does tape recording, which truly records
indiscriminately. The cameraman exercises individual judgment
regarding what to record. He frames his shots; he chooses the
angles and the direction from which to show subjects; and he
controls the lighting.' Perhaps judges fail to realize these
subtleties and the bias is only against what they perceive the
127. See supra notes 48 & 63 and accompanying text.
128. See e.g., United States v. King, 911 F. Supp. 113, 114 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (al-
lowing a newspaper reporter whose notes had been subpoenaed to "read those notes
to the Court, in order to aid the Court in its in camera review"); Government Sup-
pliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 133 F.R.D. 531, 541-42 n.20 (S.D. Ind.
1990) (noting that although the court 'would be empowered to conduct an in camera
examination of the [documents at issue], such an examination is not required here").
129. Jonathan Friendly, Ethics of Taping: Debate over the Ground Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1983, at 48 (quoting Jan Mittelstadt, editor, The People's Press).
130. For instance, a cameraman for NBC Nightly News testified in a deposition for
a defamation case that he considered himself an artist and carefully picked and
chose his shots for maximum effect. (Tom Spahn, attorney with McGuire, Woods,
Battle & Boothe, Lecture at the College of William and Mary (Feb. 15, 1996) (dis-
cussing defamation suits he has tried against the media)).
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nature of the work product to be-i.e., a mechanical recording.
In contrast, judges might be perfectly aware of the artistry in-
volved in video recording"' and the bias could indicate nega-
tive perceptions held against the medium as a whole.
Broadcasting as a Medium
Criticism of television is common. One book on the subject has
noted that "television news coverage of major issues tends to be
fragmented and devoid of much thematic or substantive con-
tent"'32 and that "networks no longer exempt the news divi-
sions from 'bottom-line' considerations."'33 Correspondent Bill
Moyers described the economic constraints placed on news divi-
sions, noting that "the center of gravity shifted from the stan-
dards and practices of the news business to show business" and
that "[iun meeting after meeting, 'Entertainment Tonight' was
touted as the model-breezy, entertaining and undemand-
ing.""s Hints of an "intellectual elite" prejudice against televi-
sion exist, as does the perception that regular viewers of televi-
sion are less discriminating or educated.' Possibly, the courts
evince a similar skepticism toward the value of television in
their treatment of the medium. Analogies to other areas of me-
dia law support this argument.
As former FCC Chairman Charles Ferris has noted, "limita-
tions on broadcast content that would be unconstitutional if ap-
plied to the print press have been routinely upheld when applied
to broadcasting."3 6 A variety of rationales explain the more
rigorous regulation of television, including the scarcity of avail-
131. See supra note 130. The judge in that case would have been aware of the
deposition testimony.
132. STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE ET AL., THE MEDIA GAME: AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE
TELEVISION AGE 4 (1993).
133. Id. at 214.
134. Jeffrey B. Abramson, Four Criticisms of Press Ethics, in DEMiOCRACY AND THE
MASS MEDIA 229, 260 (Judith Lichtenberg ed., 1990).
135. See ANSOLABEHERF, supra note 132, at 140-41. The perception is based in re-
ality, as regular newspaper readers tend to be more educated than regular television
viewers. See id. at 141.
136. Charles D. Ferris & Terrence J. Leahy, Red Lions, Tigers and Bears:
Broadcast Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 299,
309 (1989).
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able frequencies and the impact on children. 3 ' These ratio-
nales have been criticized by commentators and courts.'38 Scar-
city is not a tenable argument in the area of cable television,"'
but content regulation in broadcasting continues " and bias
against broadcast media appears in other areas.
A powerful example of judicial prejudice against the broadcast
medium exists in the federal court system's overt hostility re-
garding television cameras in the courtroom. In Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Supreme Court guaranteed the right
of the public and the press to attend criminal trials.' The
Court based its conclusion both on the long "history of ... trials
being presumptively open" " and the "First Amendment right
to 'receive information and ideas. '""' However, "[wlhen the
press seeks to photograph or broadcast courtroom proceedings,
the access question is treated quite differently."'" In fact, the
Supreme Court has "refused to interpret the First Amendment
as providing a constitutional guarantee to televise courtroom
proceedings.""'
In 1990, the United States Judicial Conference approved a
pilot program authorizing two federal courts of appeals and six
federal district courts to allow television coverage of trials."'
137. See FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 46, at 661-64. Other asserted differ-
ences between print and broadcast media on which regulations are based are public
ownership, intrusiveness, pervasiveness, inability to control access, power, vividness,
emulation of violence, illusion of reality, involuntary appearances, and speed of re-
porting. See id.
138. See Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (rejecting the "power" justification); T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Con-
tent Regulation Reconsidered, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA, supra note 134,
at 331, 331-53 (arguing that restriction of broadcast expression on the basis of con-
tent is unacceptable).
139. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994).
140. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735-38 (1978).
141. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
142. Id. at 575.
143. Id. at 576 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)).
144. FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 46, at 612.
145. Kathleen M. Krygier, The Thirteenth Juror: Electronic Media's Struggle To En-
ter State and Federal Courtrooms, 3 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 71, 78 (1995).
146. See Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Judges Vote Down TV in Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1994, at A18. Chief Justice Rehnquist heads the Judicial Conference, which
is composed of the chief judges of each circuit court of appeals and select judges
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The Federal Judicial Center monitored the experiment and is-
sued a generally favorable report on the project's first two
years. 47 At the end of the three-year program, however, the
Judicial Conference voted by a two-to-one margin against mak-
ing the pilot project permanent. 48 The underlying rationale
given for the decision was the "potentially negative effects upon
jurors and witnesses." In March 1996, the Judicial Confer-
ence reversed itself, announcing that each circuit could make its
own determination as to whether to allow cameras at the appel-
late level.'50 At this time, two circuit courts of appeal permit
television coverage and five circuit courts of appeal continue to
ban cameras.' 5' The Judicial Conference also urged that cam-
eras be banned from the federal district courts.'52
Decisions to ban television from the courtroom do not depend
on situational realities. The judges who had participated in the
Judicial Conference's experiment had discerned "few if any prob-
lems and had generally been pleasantly surprised by the experi-
ence."'53 Moreover, the federal courts had before them the ex-
ample of the forty-seven states that now allow cameras in the
courtroom, where the experience on the whole has been
favorable."
A rational basis for a ban continues to elude commentators.
One argument posits that ignoring the favorable results from
the state courts "subtly suggests that there is a greater signifi-
cance to the federal court system which warrants the mandatory
from district courts in each circuit. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Krygier, supra note 144, at 81.
150. See James C. Goodale, Cameras, the Courts and the Missing 'Simpson' Back-
lash, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 2, 1996, at 3.
151. See id. The Second and Ninth Circuits approved television coverage. See U.S.
Appeals Court Set To Ban TV Cameras, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 15, 1996, at
A18, available in 1996 WL 10964988. The First, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have banned television coverage. See id.
152. See John Flynn Rooney, U.S. Judges Here Vote To Codify Ban on Televising
Trials, Cn. DAILY L. BULL., June 18, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
153. Greenhouse, supra note 146, at A18.
154. See Krygier, supra note 144, at 76.
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closure." 5' In the same vein, another contention is that "re-
luctance to admit cameras stems also from [a] reluctance to
change tradition."'56 These arguments must be persuasive to
the courts continuing the ban, for "[wlith the miniaturization of
the broadcasting equipment and reasonable rules to preserve
courtroom decorum, no valid reason exists for not allowing the
television camera to substitute for the citizen in attendance
during a trial."'57 On the other hand, a number of federal judg-
es have expressed concerns regarding the "potential 'circus
atmosphere' invited by electronic media access."'58
The courts proclaim their concern for the judicial process, but
they protest too much. Arguments pointing to self-impor-
tance ' and blind adherence to tradition strike a more reso-
nant chord. The implication is that the medium of television is
not proper for the sanctity of the federal courts, perhaps because
it lacks seriousness or importance. Even the judges' arguments,
seemingly a nod to the power of the medium, carry negative
connotations-television is somehow not quite respectable
enough, and at the very minimum promotes disrespect for the
judicial process. 6 ° An anti-television bias, and arguably an
unreasonable one, is evident.
Of course, the effect of the O.J. Simpson trial on this debate
cannot be ignored, and it most likely confirmed many courts'
155. Id. at 82.
156. M. Ethan Katsh, The First Amendment and Technological Change: The New
Media Have a Message, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1487 n.111 (1989). Katsh com-
mented further that this rationale is "very difficult to sustain in an electronic com-
munications environment." Id.
157. David E. Kendall, Book Review, 37 VAND. L. REV. 647, 659 (1984) (reviewing
J. EDWARD GERALD, NEWS OF CRIME: COURTS AND PRESS IN CONFLICT (1983)).
158. Laralyn M. Sasaki, Note, Electronic Media Access to Federal Courtrooms: A Ju-
dicial Response, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 769, 791 (1990). The author conducted a
survey of the 738 sitting district court judges, and received 249 responses. See id. at
770 n.5. She noted that "many judges expressed this general concern." Id. at 791
n.99. The judges used such terms as "showboating," "hams," and "play-acting." Id. at
792.
159. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
160. The states are not immune to such arguments. For instance, some politicians
have reasoned that cameras in the courtroom would "transform trial lawyers into
'more Virginia hams than we've got in Smithfield.' Mary Battiata, Virginia Senate
Defeats Bill To Allow Some Courtroom TV Cameras, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1984, at
B1 (quoting an unidentified Virginia state senator during debate).
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worst fears. The judge in the Susan Smith trial, for example,
refused to allow cameras in his courtroom in part because of the
negative perceptions that followed the Simpson trial. 6' Com-
mentators have noted, however, that Judge Lance Ito can specif-
ically bear the blame for the excesses.'62 One can also fault the
networks' battle for ratings, a factor unique to that "celebrity"
trial."e In any event, judicial prejudice against cameras in the
courtroom existed long before the O.J. saga, even in the face of
evidence that cameras in the courtroom have been a positive
experience overall.
The same bias appears in cases dealing with the press's right
of access to public institutions. In Houchins v. KQED, Inc.," a
California county jail instituted the policy of allowing press
access only through regularly scheduled, limited public
tours.s Reporters could take notes, but no one could bring
cameras or tape recorders on the tours. 6' The Supreme Court
upheld the regulation, finding that the press is not entitled to
special access beyond that granted to the general public. 7 The
majority in Houchins emphasized that it was concerned with the
"freedom of the media to communicate information once it is ob-
tained," s not with the media's ability to "access [information]
on demand."'69
The Court's holding completely disregarded its "support" for
the communication of information. 7 ° Televising prison condi-
tions has little to do with access; the journalists would not have
seen more of the jail merely because they had held cameras.
Indeed, televising prison conditions has everything to do with
161. See Michelle Millhollon, Blind Justice? Media Coverage of Courtroom Trials,
QUILL, Oct. 1995, at 28, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File.
162. See Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, July 21, 1995), available in
LEXIS News Library, Script File (questioning of Judge Ito's performance by numer-
ous commentators).
163. See Reliable Sources: The Media and the O.J. Simpson Trial (CNN television
broadcast, Oct. 1, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File.
164. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
165. See id. at 4.
166. See id. at 5.
167. See id. at 11-12.
168. Id. at 9.
169. Id.
170. See supra note 23.
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communication, the very issue over which the Court supposedly
expressed such concern.' 7 ' The Court based its rationale on
principles applicable to journalists in general, but the practical
result of its holding barred the broadcast media from pris-
ons.
72
Outtakes are considered somehow less important or less re-
spectable than are "real" notes.7 Cases involving content reg-
ulation, as well as courtroom and prison access issues, attack
the issue from the opposite direction, and appear to rely on a
derogatory perception of the medium-that it is somehow less
important, or less respectable, than "real" print journalism.
Perhaps the broad aversion to the medium displays itself in the
courts' treatment of work product. If so, this bias is misplaced on
both levels.
HIDDEN CAMERAS-A WHOLE NEW VIEW?
In recent years, investigative journalism shows have overrun
the television screen, leading one commentator to term them the
"hottest trend in journalism." 4 60 Minutes, the first of the
television newsmagazines, began airing in 1969."7s Twenty
years later, 20/20 and 48 Hours had joined the fray, and by
1989 a total of seven investigative shows were storming the
networks, with more on the way. 7 1 With the growth in the
171. Justice Stewart recognized this in his concurring opinion, stating that "if a
television reporter is to convey the jail's sights and sounds to those who cannot per-
sonally visit the place, he must use cameras and sound equipment." Houchins, 438
U.S. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring).
172. The Court agreed that the press acts as the "eyes and ears" of the public, id.
at 8, but noted that the "public importance of conditions in penal facilities and the
media's role of providing information afford no basis for reading into the Constitu-
tion a right of the public or the media to enter these institutions with camera
equipment, and take moving and still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes."
Id. at 9.
173. See supra notes 108-129 and accompanying text.
174. Howard Kurtz, Hidden Network Cameras: A Troubling Trend? Critics Complain
of Deception as Dramatic Footage Yields High Ratings, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1992,
at Al.
175. See Russ W. Baker, Truth, Lies, and Videotape: PrimeTime Live and the Hid-
den Camera, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July-Aug. 1993, at 25.
176. See id. The shows are very popular. During the 1995-1996 television season,
60 Minutes was ranked ninth in the Nielsen household rankings, 20120 was ranked
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ber of these shows has come a corresponding growth in the use
of the hidden camera in investigative reporting. Although the
shows do not use hidden cameras for every segment that they
produce, producers do have an "insatiable hunger for the kind of
documentation that looks good on screen.... Secretly recorded
video, where the viewers see the action with their own eyes, may
be the tastiest delicacy of all." 77 The use of hidden cameras for
investigative reporting brings a different spin to the analysis of
legal attitudes toward television. This section examines why the
television editorial process, even where it involves hidden cam-
era footage, should be protected in the same way as the print
editorial process.
Why Protect the Editorial Process?
One of the cornerstones of press freedom is its ability to
choose what to publish, and as the Court has noted, "[flor better
or worse, editing is what editors are for; ... [tihat edi-
tors-newspaper or broadcast-can and do abuse this power is
beyond doubt, but that is no reason to deny the discretion."'78
The Court acknowledged a (very) qualified reporter's privilege
for the editorial process in Herbert v. Lando,179 and the lower
courts have expanded on the notion. 8 '
eleventh, PrimeTime Live was ranked eighteenth, and Dateline was ranked twenty-
ninth. See Diane Werts, Glued to the Tube, Making Sense of Ratings, Networks,
Nielsens and the Nonsense That Kills Certain Shows: Final Rankings for 1995-96 TV
Shows, NEWSDAY, June 4, 1996, at B49.
177. Baker, supra note 175, at 26. One of the reasons that reporters do not always
use hidden cameras may be cost. Because of the extra labor and research involved in
undercover investigations, PrimeTime Live often spends twice as much on stories ob-
tained as a result of hidden camera reporting as compared to regular pieces. See id.
178. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973) (disagreeing
with the court of appeals's finding that the speaker is the "best judge" of what the
listening public ought to hear, and noting that "[alil journalistic tradition and experi-
ence is to the contrary").
179. 441 U.S. 153, 174 (1979) ("There is no law that subjects the editorial process
to private or official examination merely to satisfy curiosity or to serve some general
end such as the public interest; and if there were, it would not survive constitu-
tional scrutiny.").
180. See, e.g., Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1306 (8th Cir. 1986)
(recognizing that "a]ccounts of past events are always selective, and under the First
Amendment the decision of what to select must almost always be left to writers and
editors"); United States v. Marcos, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2005, 2007 (S.D.N.Y.
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Why is it so important to protect the editorial process? One of
the more frequently invoked arguments is that compelling a
reporter to produce his resource material will have a "chilling
effect" on the dissemination of the news. 8' As Justice Brennan
argued in Gertz v. Welch,'82 "[diemocracy requires an informed
and accurate press, and predecisional editorial communication[]
contribute[s] to informed and accurate editorial judgments. " "
Other, more practical, rationales also exist. One court has
recognized the possibility that disclosure of notes or outtakes
could "prompt reporters or editors to purge from publication any
information they fear would excite the interest of current or
prospective litigants."" Another court has noted that requir-
ing media organizations to respond to subpoenas would interfere
with the productivity of journalists and other employees, as well
as increasing expenditures for legal fees.'85 In litigation involv-
ing issues such as unfair competition or commercial libel, the
media could be drawn into public disputes between commercial
parties because they expressed an opinion favorable to . one
side."'86 The media could become a discovery tool-either as an
arm of the government, or for private parties-and litigants
could begin their discovery by subpoenaing and deposing report-
1990) (noting "the press'[s] independence in its 'selection and choice of material for
publication!" (citations omitted)).
181. See Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (agreeing
that "requiring [a reporter to reveal his sources] necessarily has a 'chilling effect
upon his functioning as a reporter and upon the flow of information to the general
public"); see also Maughan v. NL Indus., 524 F. Supp. 93, 95 (D.D.C. 1981) (noting
that "[tihe right of a newspaper to determine for itself what it is to publish and
how it is to fulfill its mandate of dissemination must be given great respect if an
unfettered press is to exist and information is to flow unhindered from it to the
public").
182. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
183. William J. Brennan III, Brennan on Brennan: The Justice's Views on the
Structural Role of the First Amendment, N.J. LAW., Aug.-Sept. 1994, at 8.
184. Marcos, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2007.
185. See United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988).
186. See, e.g., In re Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 582, 586
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[If [defendant] is susceptible to being drawn into private disputes
between commercial or other institutional entities simply because [defendant] has ex-
pressed an opinion favorable to the dispute, in favor of one side or the other, a sig-
nificant burden will be placed on [defendant's] coverage of provocative issues impor-
tant to the public.").
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ers covering the story.'
The policies underlying protection of the editorial process are
no less valid for broadcasting than for print, and protection
plays an equally vital role in both media." A bias against
television, whatever its roots, is not a justification for greater
interference with something as fundamental as the editorial pro-
cess. Even something as seemingly innocuous as harsher treat-
ment of work product goes to the heart of the editorial process.
Television reporters sometimes do cross ethical and legal lines,
but "[clalculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve
higher values,"18 9 and other avenues exist by which to control
media excesses.
Investigative Reporting-Work Product
An outtake is an outtake, it might be argued, but unfortunate-
ly for the investigative journalists, this may not be so. Given the
judicial biases against even "traditional" video'Pi-where every-
one is aware that he is on film, and the cameraman has actual
control over the images-it is feasible that courts would grant
hidden camera outtakes third-class status. After all, a court
could equate a hidden camera secreted on a journalist or in a
room with the cameras in the corner of a convenience store; both
simply record what passes in front in them and no more.
Nevertheless, hidden camera outtakes should not be treated
any differently than standard outtakes. By whatever means the
footage is gathered, the policy driving the privilege-protection
of the editorial process-remains unchanged. The test for
discoverability should be the same for any type of footage. Judg-
187. See Miller v. Mecklenburg County, 602 F. Supp. 675, 679 (W.D.N.C. 1985).
188. Sandra Baron, the executive director of the Libel Defense Resource Center,
has suggested that television work product may warrant even more protection than
print work product. See Elizabeth Jensen, ABC Fights Lawsuit by Food Lion Inuolu-
ing Newsgathering Methods, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 1995, at B6. Baron noted that
there are more suits based on news-gathering today than ever before, and that
"[unlike print news organizations which rely on written notes, television organiza-
tions may be uniquely vulnerable if they have to turn over unaired videotape that
shows 'all the glitches, the human aspects of reporting'." Id. (quoting Sandra Baron).
189. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 125 (1973).
190. See supra notes 108-29 and accompanying text.
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es should require that all outtakes be highly relevant, necessary
or critical to the claim, and unobtainable elsewhere. 9'
Investigative Reporting-The Genre
Investigative reporting plays a fundamental role in the struc-
ture of our nation's government, perhaps more so than any other
genre of the press. As the "fourth estate,"'92 the press has spe-
cial status arising from "the broad societal interest in a full and
free flow of information to the public,"'93 and the idea of the
press as monitor.' The Court long has acknowledged the re-
sponsibility of informing the public as one of the core purposes
of the Free Press Clause,'95 and in Estes v. Texas,'96 it noted
that the press "has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public
interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among
191. See supra note 42. Of course, treating hidden camera outtakes as equal to
standard outtakes still affords them less protection than that granted to print work
product.
192. "Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters'
Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all. It is not
a figure of speech, or a witty saying; it is a literal fact,--very momentous to us in
these times." THOMAS CARLYLE, CARLYLE'S LECTURES ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIp AND
THE HEROIC IN HISTORY 188 (Archibald MacMechan ed., 1901).
193. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
194. Justice Stewart argued that the primary purpose of the Free Press Clause was
"to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the
three official branches," and noted the opening words of the Massachusetts Free
Press Clause, which was drafted by John Adams: "[tihe liberty of the press is essen-
tial to the security of the state." Stewart, supra note 22, at 634.
195. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536 (1989) (allowing newspaper
to print an article because it concerned a "matter of public significance") (citation
omitted); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (noting that "the free flow of commercial information [is] in-
dispensable" in enabling the public to be well informed); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (finding that a statement printed in a newspaper
was protected by the First Amendment because "lilt communicated information . . .
[concerning] matters of the highest public interest and concern"); Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (finding a "paramount public interest in a free flow of
information to the people concerning public officials"); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that
the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse . . . sources is essen-
tial to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a full society.").
196. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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public officers and employees and generally informing the citi-
zenry of public events and occurrences." 97
Investigative news shows fulfill this role to the utmost. How-
ever one may feel about the methods used by such shows as
Hard Copy and PrimeTime Live, it is impossible to ignore the
power of the end result. For instance, PrimeTime Live has
pointed a hidden camera into the London hotel room of
Malawi's president, documenting the shopping binge of the
leader of one of the world's poorest countries. It has shown
Wichita students selling guns, Peruvians defrauding adop-
tion-minded Americans by selling them unexportable babies,
doctors who repeatedly misread mammograms, and a quadri-
plegic patient crying out amid filthy conditions at a veterans
hospital.... [and] followed members of Congress to a lobby-
ist-funded vacation in Florida.198
Not only are the newsmagazines exposing stories that need to
be in the public eye, they are exposing them to record numbers
of people. Nearly ninety-nine percent of American households
have a television,99 and nearly eighty percent of the adult pop-
ulation relies solely on television for news information.Y0
Moreover, many Americans find television to be the most credi-
ble source of news, much more so than newspapers, radio, and
magazines. 0'° Regardless of commentators' feelings, television
plays a vital role in educating a large majority of Americans.
Negative attitudes do, however, exist against the
"tabloidization" of television news in general,0 2 and there is a
197. Id. at 539.
198. Baker, supra note 176, at 26.
199. See ANSOLABEHERE, supra note 132, at 12.
200. See id. at 43. Only 20% of adults rely solely on print media for their news.
See id. at 44.
201. See id.
202. As one commentator has noted:
Instead of beating their entertainment and propaganda competitors, many
journalists are joining them. The increased competition spawned by the
new technologies has led some traditional news purveyors to 'go
tabloid'--increasing coverage of celebrity gossip, bizarre crime, and sex
scandals to try to retain their mass audience. Television news and maga-
zine programs, in particular, have loosened their standards and defini-
tions of what makes news.
ELLEN HUME, TABLOIDS, TALK RADIO, AND THE FUTURE OF NEWS: TECHNOLOGY'S
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backlash against what is seen as a decrease in the quality of the
more respected newsmagazines." 3 Perhaps the quality of
broadcast news has deteriorated, and perhaps "tabloid T.V." is to
blame. Nevertheless, television should not be subject to more
rigorous controls of its editorial process merely because it is
television, or even bad television.
When Jerry Falwell sued Hustler magazine because of an
offensive ad parody, the Supreme Court emphasized heavily the
important role satirical cartoons have played in public and polit-
ical debate."4 According to the Court, "the caricature of
[Falwell] and his mother published in Hustler [was] at best a
distant cousin of [political cartoons], and a poor relation at
that." °5 Nevertheless, the Court decided that it would be im-
possible to impose a "principled standard" that would "separate
the one from the other."
20 6
The argument flowing from this is not that the use of hidden
cameras, or television cameras in general, should be protected
by an absolute First Amendment privilege. The point is that all
types of outtakes, as much as written notes, are the raw materi-
als from which journalists work. The fact that the media-print
and broadcast-differ is not a principled standard, and the
courts should not interfere at greater lengths in television's
editorial process because of an unwarranted or warranted bias
against the medium.
IMPACT ON JOURNALISM 12 (1995).
203. One television critic, commenting on the failing credibility of newsmagazines,
noted that:
[Tihe networks simply overloaded the airwaves with magazines, in the
mistaken belief that the viewer appetite for news--or, more precisely,
entertaining nonfiction stories-was bottomless.... [T]he competition
and ratings pressure drove down the quality of journalism on the maga-
zines. ABC, in particular, has been hit with a flurry of lawsuits, particu-
larly over hidden-camera reporting.
Marc Gunther, Prime-Time Blues: Magazine Shows Try To Regroup After a Bad
Year, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1995, at G7.
204. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988).
205. Id. at 55.
206. Id.
1848
REPORTERS PRIVILEGE
A Focus ON THE SUBSTANCE
The evidentiary tests regarding production of work product do
not differ for print and broadcast, and should apply in the same
degree to outtakes, including hidden-camera outtakes. Courts
have raised concerns about issues particularly applicable to
broadcasting, including the degree of intrusiveness, the power,
and the reach of the medium."7 These concerns may be valid,
especially so in hidden camera use, but de facto differentiation
between print and broadcast on the work product level is not the
solution.
The answer is to implement more rigorously the substantive
checks that do exist. Suits such as the one filed by Food Lion
now occur with greater frequency, and Food Lion's success at the
trial level will undoubtedly encourage even more.2"8 Actions for
invasion of privacy, trespass, and fraud all effectively address
behavior peculiar to television.2 9 One commentator has even
suggested the institution of a tort for intrusion in public plac-
es;210 libel or infliction of emotional distress are possibilities as
well. Rather than whittle away at the First Amendment priv-
ilege from the inside, the Court should openly confront egregious
instances of media misbehavior.
Ideally, self-policing is the answer. The ethics of professional
journalism should address these problems. For instance, a heat-
ed debate exists among journalists over the use of hidden camer-
as. Some professionals feel that, ethically, their use is inappro-
priate,' while others consider hidden cameras to be an in-
207. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
208. See John J. Walsh et al., Media Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin: The Con-
stitutionality of Consequential Damages for Publication of Ill-Gotten Information, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1111 (1996) (describing recent cases concerning the
press's exercise of its First Amendment power).
209. See id. at 1112.
210. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort
Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989 (1995) (pro-
posing a redefinition of the tort of intrusion to allow recovery for highly offensive in-
stances of public intrusion, including violations of the right of "public privacy").
211. Marvin Kalb, an investigative journalist who is now the director of Harvard
University's Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, has argued that
"[i]nvestigative journalism doesn't give us the right to become investigative detec-
tives.... I don't think we should be in the business of deceiving people." Laurence
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valuable tool in exposing crime and wrongdoing.212 Out of this
debate has developed a set of standards promulgated by the
Society of Professional Journalists that supports the use of hid-
den cameras only when the issue is of profound importance and
there are no other alternatives for obtaining the same informa-
tion.213 Unfortunately, reliance on ethics alone is not enough,
as evidenced by ongoing instances of media misbehavior. Never-
theless, unlawful action by the broadcast media should be at-
tacked directly, by the parties involved, rather than through
discriminatory judicial interference with the editorial process.
Alison Lynn Tuley
Zuckerman, Sticky Issues in Gumshoe Journalism: When Is It Right to Use New
High-Tech Spying Devices?, TIME, Aug. 8, 1988, at 72 (quoting Marvin Kalb).
212. Don Hewitt, the executive producer of 60 Minutes justified the use of decep-
tion and hidden cameras, noting "[it's the small crime versus the greater
good .... If you catch someone violating 'thou shalt not steal' by your 'thou shalt
not lie,' that's a pretty good trade-off." Colman McCarthy, Getting the Truth Untruth-
fully, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1992, at D21 (quoting Don Hewitt).
213. See Baker, supra note 176, at 28. Further guidelines are given, including that
the harm prevented must outweigh the harm caused by the act of deception. Id.
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